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Resumen 
Este artículo ofrece una interpretación de la historia universal según la cual el fin de la 
historia es la concepción filosófica de la modernidad y no el concepto de la historia total 
incluyendo el futuro. Por esta razón, el concepto del fin de la historia se debe liberar de 
concepciones demasiado naturales del tiempo y de los procesos históricos. La historia 
universal es la historia de los estados soberanos que llega a su fin cuando la filosofía 
comprende la pluralidad misma de los estados como el medio en donde la libertad racional 
se puede realizar a sí misma. Este es un final espiritual que se ha liberado de una cultura 
o historia particular 
Abstract 
This article ofTers an interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of world-history in which the 
end of history is conceived of as the philosophical conception of modernity, not as a 
concept of total history including the future. Therefore, the concept of the end of history 
must be freed from too natural conceptions of time and historical processes. World-
history is the history of sovereign states that comes to its end when philosophy can 
grasp the actual plurality of states as the médium in which rational freedom can realise 
itself. This is a spiritual closure that freed itself from a particular culture or history. 
History, for Hegel, is the process during which spirit realises itself From a 
modem perspective on the science of history, Hegel's ambitious attempt to 
develop a total concept of world-history seems to be almost unbelievable arro-
gance. I doubt if this reproof of Hegel's concept of history is based on an 
adequate understanding of his undertaking. Against the idea that Hegel's phi-
losophy of history aimed to determine the total, and, therefore, also the fiíture 
course of history, one can emphasise that, for Hegel, history is about the past. 
History has only to do with what has been or is, with events and facts (VPG p. 
20).'»Hegers comment that philosophy is always interested in the present, even 
when it is dealing with the past, does not change this understanding of 'history' 
(VPG pp. 105, 106). It is only through knowledge of the real course of history 
that philosophy can arrive at a concrete concept of how reason can realise its 
ends. Thus 'the end of history' must be taken as a retrospective concept and 
read in coimection with a philosophical concept of the past. 
It can, I think, be said that, for Hegel, every episode and period of history has 
its own end or aim in itself, notwithstanding the fact that the present can con-
ceive the past as the necessary path and a moment of its own development. 
' I thank Julián Young (Auckland) and Emst-Otto Onasch (Nijmegen) for their 
corrections and very usefiíl suggestions. 
'. 'VPG' is an abbreviation of: G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der 
Geschichte, Hegels Werke in20 Bánden, Frankfurt 1971 (Suhikamp), Bd.l2. 
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Every historical period is and was to some degree present to itself and cannot 
adequately be considered as a mere passage towards a future end. If that is 
true, we can state that any philosophy which involves an adequate concept of 
its contemporary world virtually grasps time 'in its end', i.e. seen from its 
finishing post in history. But not every period knows what it knows in this ex-
plicit manner because the philosophical systems of past periods lack the philo-
sophical logic in which this knowledge can become absolutely clear. I will elabó-
rate this interpretation in the first section of this paper. According to it, Hegel's 
philosophy of history would not be a mere supplement of his philosophical sys-
tem or an application of philosophical concepts to history as an external object, 
but precisely that part of the system in which it conceives itself as the ad-
equate conception of the modern world. 
The notion of the 'end of history' is an ambiguous one. Firstly, it means the 
ultímate goal at which rational activity is directed. As such, it could be a tran-
scendent ideal or a merely regulative idea. That is the maimer in which Kant 
conceives the end of history. The end of history can, secondly, be thought of as 
a moment or a period in time. Detached from the first meaning, the second 
would be a contamination of history with a puré contingent end of natural time, 
which would be, I believe, at least for Hegel, a paradoxical conception. The 
solution of this paradox is the concept of the end of history as the fiílfilment of 
its ultímate goal in time. The life of organic beings can be thought of in this way. 
But this life of natural organic beings is repeated endlessly, and how could the 
history of the spirit end in an endless tedious repetition of the same? The con-
cept of the end of history as a product of the spirit must involve another con-
cept of time, a change of natural time into 'spiritual time'. Hegel's concept of 
history can be seen as the concept of the permanent execution of this change 
by reason itself The end of world-history is the moment in which reason 
recognises itself in its objective products as this spiritual power over natural 
time. The second section of my paper goes into this relation of spiritual and 
natural time. 
The world of modernity Hegel inhabits believes itself to be a rational world. 
But it believes this in a lacerated or alienated way, which drives it away into 
illusions, utopias, despair and scepticism. The key to understand the rationalism 
of the modem world, for Hegel, is not an abstract norm of rationality, but the 
concept of its objective reality as the end of a rational product or process. 
Hegel's particular philosophical concept of modemity conceives of itself as the 
product of reason as a historical reality. But if a historical period can under-
stand itself in this way, it does not change the merely particular experience of 
itself, as an end in and for itself, into an absolute end, but discovers the concept 
I I borrowed this expression from K.R. Meist, Diñerenzen in Hegels Deutang der 
'Neuesten Zeit' innerhalb seiner Konzeption der Weltgeschichte, in: H.-C. Lucas and O. 
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of reality as such, as 'the presence of etemity in the temporal transition'.^ Not 
so much the subjective-historical conviction that modemity could understand 
itself as the end of history, but the objective insight that the end of history as 
such, which was considered until then as transcendent or non-existent, can be 
understood as present reality, appears to be the subject of Hegel's philosophy 
of world-history, of his project to conceive of the absolute spirit in its historical 
existence. Does this mean that, for Hegel, absolute spirit and the concept of 
world-history coincide? I do not think so. I will try to characterise their relation 
in the third and the last part of this article. 
1. T H E END OF WORLD-HISTORY AS A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT 
In the Preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel states that the histori-
cal period he is living in is a period of transition.^ What he had primarily in mind 
was that the formal concepts and ideas of contemporary science and philoso-
phy about rationality were not adequate for a tme. self-understanding of the 
spirit of the modem world, but that they could be conceived of as the last dark 
moments from which, at a bound, dialectical thinking could move to absolute 
knowledge. Only from this standpoint of absolute knowledge could a tme con-
cept of modemity be developed. The Phenomenology of Spirit had to show 
that the Enlightenment's formal concepts of rationality and freedom, in their 
opposition to religious belief, were merely a last passage to the concrete dialec-
tical concept of knowledge. The assertion that modemity could be understood 
in this way, as a passage and not only as a negativo result of scepticism, re-
mained to be proved in a positive concept of history. I think that Hegel's Phi-
losophy of History can be considered in some way as the counterpart of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, insofar as the former intends to conceive of moder-
nity as the positive result of the development of rational freedom in its concrete 
reality, rather than as a product of reason in an abstract form, as developed by 
the Enlightenment in the shape of the French Revolution and of liberalism. 
Especially in the later versions of his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der 
Weltgeschichte, Hegel emphasises that the philosophical reflection on history 
is fimdamentally different from other forms of historical knowledge.'' History is 
Póggeler (eds.), Hegels Rechtsphilosophie im Zusammenhang der europáischen 
Verfassungsgeschichte, Stuttgart 1986, pp. 465-501. 
^ G.W.F. Hegel, Phánomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hofineister, Hambiu'g (F. Meiner) 
1952 p. 15. 
^ Cf FranzHespe, 'Die Geschichte ist der Fortschritt im Bewusstsein der Freiheit', 
Zur Entwicklung von Hegels Philosophie der Geschichte, in: Hegel-Studien Bd.26, 
Bonn 1991, pp 177-192, 
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the way in which people express the spiritual principie that govems them. The 
spirit of a particular people is, as a finite form, subordínate to the history of the 
universal spirit, whose history is called world-history by Hegel, and whose 
principie is the free development of the idea of the spirit as such. Hegel's 
philosophy presupposes that the history of the world can be understood as the 
íeZ/'-realisation of spirit. The idea of spirit as freedom is not only the key con-
cept for understanding the end of modemity in itself, but also of its history. 
History can be conceived of not by the laws of nature, but by the way reason 
succeeds in expressing its own principies in objective reality. This self-expres-
sion is the freedom of reason, although it was not understood as such until 
Hegel's days. So the spiritual history of the world must be ultimately compre-
hensible as a rational totality. 
That reason realises itself in its end as freedom is not a judgement that could 
be the conclusión of empirical knowledge and historical experience alone. The 
conviction that world-history must be understood as the work of reason is a 
philosophical a priori. In a religious mode of thinking, it is the belief that 
history in its entirety is a matter of divine providence. Thus, for Hegel, philo-
sophical history means that the great events of the past and the general course 
of history can be understood in the light of this idea. Hegel asserts that the 
rationality of this presumption is given in his Logic and is, as such, not a matter 
of the philosophy of history itself The philosophy of history can demónstrate 
the tmth of this concept by understanding real history in its concrete develop-
ment as a rational whole. But this concept of history and its relation to logic is 
itself a historical conception that first became clear in Hegel's philosophy. A 
philosophical concept of world-history can only be developed from the moment 
that world-history itself has reached the spiritual result that can be conceived of 
as its rational end. Therefore, world-history is itself a special or concrete total-
ity of time; it is time that has come to its end. 
World-history has come to its end as soon as a world or plurality of sover-
eign states, each of them with its own historical end, can be grasped, retrospec-
tively, as a rational unity that must and can be conceived of as the product of 
spiritual activity. From that moment, world-history is a concept by which mod-
em Europe can understand itself as the rational end-product of the long and 
laborious history of the Ancient World. Thus, Hegel's concept of world-history 
is the counterpart of the more abstract idea of a federation of republican states, 
developed by Kant in his Zum ewigen Frieden. This Kantian idea is a moral 
product of his philosophy of law, an abstract ideal to which nation-states are 
morally committed. In his own philosophy of law, Hegel denied that, at the level 
of world-history, the ultímate concept of public law could be translated into 
such an ideal of a republican worldstate. In his philosophy of history, Hegel 
seems to replace the Kantian ideal of a utopian state of etemal peace by the 
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free development of a plurality of sovereign constitutional European states as 
the key concept for understanding actual history as an end in i t se l f 
But, as I hope to show in the last section of this paper, this is not the ultímate 
position from which philosophy conceives of history, for Hegel either. 
World-history, for Hegel, is the time that begins with the rise of the Persian 
Empire in Mesopotamia (VPG pp. 215-216). The territories around the Medi-
terranean are the first stage of this spectacle, which later on moves its centre 
towards Westem Europe, where world-history comes to its end: 'Eastem Asia 
and the land beyond the Alps are the extremities of that mobile centre around 
the Mediterranian Sea - beginning and end of world-history, its rise and fall.' 
(VPG p. 116). Apparently, world-history, for Hegel, is just like an individual 
person and a nation-state, a particular figure of spirit that realises itself in a 
determínate área of time-space. We can characterise this period of history as 
the time that was needed by the universal World-spirit for realising its end - its 
rational self-development in freedom - from the moment that this end can be 
recognised as the mling principie of history. Therefore, world-history is a retro-
spective matter. It can only be conceived of as the concept of the development 
of world-spirit until the present, as the philosophical self-conception of the world-
spirit in its process of becoming. For Hegel, the 'end of world-history' is the 
present in which the freedom of spirit has reached such a general and objective 
worldly shape in political forms and institutions that the past can be conceived 
of as the process and work of freedom itself 
Some authors have drawn the doubtful conclusión that, for Hegel, there would 
be no more history after he had thought world-history to its end. Hegel's words 
do indeed suggest that world-history came to its end in Hegel's time. Does the 
end of this history imply the possibility of another world-history, namely, one of 
the New World? As such, the conception of end does not say anything about 
the real future in the sense of determining the concrete course of the ñiture. 
What we know is that, for Hegel, the future of our westem world as a rational 
one can only be a matter of the free thinking of future generations and peoples. 
Could philosophy anticipate such a new path of world-history? Hegel himself 
does not give clear answers to thesé questions but remains somewhat ambiva-
lent. An answer presupposes that we can free the notion of history from the 
notion of natural time and can determine more specifically the relation between 
time and absolute spirit. 
'. Cí Hegel's criticism of Kant in G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des 
Rechts, §§ 333-337, Hamburg(F Meiner) 1955, pp. 285-287. 
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2. TIME OF SPIRIT AND NATURAL TIME 
By characterising history as the work, or labour, of spirit, Hegel underlines that 
the plurality and abundance of cultural figures and national differences are 
themselves a product of spiritual activity and do not stay in an external relation 
to spirit itself Therefore, in history, this plurality must have a totally different 
meaning than the rich multitude of species and specimens in which organic 
nature appears to exist. At the top of its development, in the concept of life, 
nature falls asunder into a mass of individuáis and processes ending in death, so 
that none of them can express themselves as an actual totality. Individuáis die 
for the survival of the species, which seems to be their intemal, conceptual, 
destiny.* But the species cannot exist for itself; it can express itself only in the 
plurality of finite individuáis, in which it seems to lose its inner unity or identity.̂  
In the Encyclopedia Hegel speaks of die Ohnmacht der Natur, the impo-
tence of nature to maintain the severity or discipline of the concept, for which 
the multitude in nature means a fall into decay. In his Lectures on the Philoso-
phy of History he speaks of die Ohnmacht des Lebens, the impotence of life 
to take together in one individual figure the begitming and the end of its process 
of development. Spirit, on the contrary, is able to retum into itself and is thus the 
result of its own activity (íTG p. 104). 
Spirit provides its reality for itself insofar as it succeeds in forming a particu-
lar individual entity that breaks the circular course of nature. This means that 
this individuality has the capacity to gain the victory over death in a particular 
spiritual way. In a certain sense, the victory over death is the end of (natural) 
time. Many religious, therefore, imagine the life of spirit as a living on after 
death. But the end in which spirit comes to life cannot be thought of as a 
moment of natural time that rolls on in an endless continuity. Spirit brings this 
time to an end by mastering it, by integrating it into its own being. For Hegel, 
this mastering of time is not a static moment or a rigid etemal present in which 
time and history would have come to a standstill, but is itself a process in time, 
now conceived of as the time of spirit. 
In general, we can characterise the time of the spirit as the duration of the 
process whereby an individual spiritual entity forms itself in the objective, ex-
ternal world. It is a time that is in itself directed towards an end, a time of 
awakening, development, maturation, and completion of a whole, that asserts 
itself as an individual spiritual valué in and for itself The time of the spirit has as 
its end the coming to fiíll self-consciousness of spirit, which is only possible in a 
world that is not alien to it and that it has to recognise as such and thus to make 
' . G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopadie derphilosophischen Wissenschaften (1830), §§ 374-
375, Hamburg (F. Meiner) 1959, pp. 308-309. 
'. Plídnomenologie, p. 220. 
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into its own property. The spirit needs a world for its real existence and it needs 
time for the appropriation of this world and for the realisation of itself as a free, 
self-conscious spirit.* The awakening and maturation of a spiritual principie, 
according to Hegel, is mostly a tiresome and extended process. But as soon as 
the principie has fully developed itself, when it has recognised itself and 
asserted itself as such, natural time has become in a certain sense superflu-
ous. For a human being getting oíd is like a gradual breaking free from time: the 
body, which is tied to the natural time, petrifies, but the spirit delivers itself from 
limíted interests.' 
Peoples and nation-states, which also constitute spiritual totalities for them-
selves, endure, like individuáis, a natural death when they have realised their 
aim and only stay to continué their existence according to custom. In that case, 
they conduct a life from which every interest of spirit has withdrawn, a lifeless 
existence of boredom and without any political interest (VPG p. 100). In con-
trast, sovereign peoples, forming a state which plays an active role in world-
history, mostly die in a more dramatic and vehement way, often soon after they 
have reached the culmination of their flourishing. For such a people, 'the fmits 
of its labour do not fall into its own lap, but rather become for it a bitter draught.' 
The taste of it is its destmction, from which, nevertheless, a new principie can 
arise that will, in tum, guide world-history (VPG p. 104). 
Not everything that happens to the spirit is part of its history proper. History is 
confined by the mterests of the spirit in its ends. The philosophical conception 
of history, in particular, must be arrived at by that interest and must be able to 
put aside all fortuitous and unimportant circumstances. The essential charac-
teristics of the spirit and its time, according to Hegel, are always caught in the 
great events with important consequences. A people does not make history 
until it makes itself free and organises itself as a political state. Therefore, a 
stateless people, which is but a nation, is not yet able to make history. The 
history of a people is the realisation of its own particular spiritual principie, its 
own 'Volksgeist'. Such a people tells and transmits its genuine history inprose, 
which Hegel calis the language of the state (VPG p. 83)'°. The time which 
precedes that period is the people's pre-history, which is remembered in myths 
and epic poetry. Notwithstanding the fact that India and China had already 
developed forms of imperial states, they are considered by Hegel as empires 
that properly belong to pre-history, or at any rate, not to world-history because 
they do not show decisive episodes of progress towards freedom (VPG 
*. Cf G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen zur Geschiclite der Philosophie I, Hegels Werke in 
20 Bánden, Frankfiut 1971, Bd. 18, pp. 54-55,123, 
'. Enzyklopadie, § 396, p, 323, 
'°, Also Vorlesungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie I, pp. 108, 116-117, 
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pp. 136-137, 178). In these empires, the spirit is petrified into a system of rigid 
customs, as it is in China, or exhausts itself in a gay multitude of forms without 
inner consistency and rational order, as in India, 
If one may draw a parallel between what Hegel says about the life of indi-
viduáis and peoples on the one hand and the development of world-history on 
the other, Europe would sink after the full realisation of its principie into a period 
of obsolescence, petrifaction, or destmction, Such a prospect would not be a 
particular prediction of the fiíture, but the conclusión of a more general concep-
tion of history, Even if this view is implied by Hegel's philosophy of history, it is 
not a messenger of calamity; rather, by presenting itself as the consciousness 
of the past culminating point, it was the chalice from which the westem world 
would taste its ovra finiteness, Would there, according to this line of thinking, be 
no more history and development after Hegel? Or may we conceive of the 
fiiture course of history - in contrast to what Hegel seems to say himself - not 
as a period of decay but as one of etemal youth or maturity in which freedom 
will realise itself in a continuously more rich and universal way, as Emst Bloch 
asserted from a utopian-Marxist point of view?'' I think we do not have to 
choose between these opposites, 
Hegel's own writings do not offer clear starting-points for an answer to these 
questions conceming the future. He characterises Europe as the last part of the 
'Ancient World', Europe itself in its tum has three parts: the territories around 
the Mediterranean, which embody its youth; the heart of Europe with Franco, 
England and Germany as the most important states in respect of world-history; 
and finally, the north-eastem part of Europe, which, through its narrow coimec-
tion with pre-historical Asia, is beginning to flourish only recently and does not 
yet possess stable political constitutions. How Europe would develop on at that 
eastern side remains unclear for Hegel, But he does not exelude the possibility 
of interesting developments on that side. 
Next to the Ancient World, a New World is emerging on the continents of 
Australia and America, where big empires are forming new states (VPG p. 
107), It is clear that Hegel cormects these countries with a future history, Ap-
parently, he sees here a total new domain for the realisation of the principie of 
freedom, which, in those áreas, will be less burdened by the laborious historical 
course of its development and will probably meet totally new tasks, challenges 
and problems, To what extent their history will be comparable with the history 
known to us remains unspoken, From a political, cultural and religious point of 
view, Hegel does not think much of the way America had, until then, developed, 
as an effect of the European desire for renewing. Nevertheless, he calis it the 
land of the future that has yet to prove its world-historical importance, for ex-
ample, in a stmggle between North and South America. But as land of the 
", EmstBloch,Z)a5P/-//iz/>//q/rrt««g,Frankfiirtl959,p. 1055. 
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future, it falls outside the scope of Hegel's interest because his philosophy of 
history 'has to do only with the past, insofar as it is history, and with what is 
present and etemal, insofar as it is philosophy'(íTG p. 114), 
It therefore remains unclear whether we have to speak, here, in Hegel's 
terms, of a new period of world-history (which thus would not come to its end) 
or whether his remarks give rise to a 'New-World-history' of which we know 
the point of department but not the particular principies of development, It seems 
sensible to me to detach Hegel's conception of the end of history and of the 
closing of a historical period, more than he does himself, from the organic meta-
phors of growing, flowering and withering, Hegel himself already gives an im-
portant pointer in this direction by his way of connecting the end of an oíd with 
the beginning of a new historical period. 
3. ABSOLUTE SPIRIT AND PHILOSOPHY AS THE CLOSING OF HISTORY 
A well-known passage in the preface of Hegel's Philosophy of Right states 
that philosophy always comes too late to teach a lesson to its contemporary 
world: 'The owl of Minerva starts its flight only at the coming of dusk', when 
time has ripened and exhausted, in its flowering, its power for rejuvenation and 
cultural development,'^ Only then is philosophy able to hold up the concept of 
the contemporary world in its rational form like a mirror to the real world, The 
philosophical concept is like a mirror in which the real world can recognise 
itself as an intellectual realm, but it is not a prescription for making the world 
new and youthfiíl. So, for Hegel, philosophy does not have a direct role in the 
process of renewing, Philosophy is not the stimulant that the world needs for 
the realisation of reason in its historical form as objective spirit, 
Rather, the impetuousness by which history is made and pressed forward is 
found outside of philosophy, Hegel thinks, in the first place, of historical indi-
viduáis, great statesmen and generáis like Alexander, Caesar and Napoleón, 
whose passions and desires are used by the cuiming of reason for the realisation 
of its ends behind their backs, Philosophy only plays its role when the cunning 
of reason has reached its end and the blaze of history has passed over, To be 
sure, Hegel also characterises a philosopher like Plato as a historical individual,'^ 
He does this not so much because Plato had such a good conception of his own 
contemporary world, as because Plato's philosophy already presents the con-
cept of the end of world-history according to which the ancient Greek world 
had to pass away. Plato's stmggle to save Greek culture, by etemalizing it 
through the exclusión of subjective freedom and individuality, became a mo-
'̂ , Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, p. 17. 
'^ G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie II, Hegels Werke in 
20 Bánden, Frankfurt 197 l,Bd 19, p 12. 
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ment of its downfall as a particular culture.''' The essential task of philosophy, 
however, is something different from playing such a historical role. Genuine 
philosophical insight is, in a certain sense, withdrawn from history.'^ For 
philosophy, world-history is not the ultímate reality, as it is for peoples and nation-
states, whose place in history is determined by world-history in its form of 'das 
Weltgericht', the 'world's court of justice'.'* 
This 'Weltgericht' must not be seen, I think, as the ultímate concept within 
which the end of history is conceived of World-history is a history of sovereign 
states, which, in their mutual rivalry, shape a historical form for the universal 
spirit as 'Weltgeist' and confine the individuáis to their particular places in his-
tory, To a certain degree in contrast to this, art and religión withdraw the indi-
vidual from this historical totalisation. So, they are figures of the absolute ('un-
tied') spirit, although their forms of understanding are themselves closely tied to 
their historical environment. Philosophy's task is to develop the conceptual 
understanding of this relation between the objective and the absolute spirit. 
Thus, it is the expression of the moment at which the objective spirit unbinds 
itself from its particular historical world and recognises itself in this world as a 
moment of the absolute spirit, as expressed by art and religión. From this point 
of view, a maturo philosophy is always that moment of spiritual reality at which 
history clases itself, the moment at which the objective spirit, as historical real-
ity, in fiíll self-consciousness passes over into the sphere of the absolute spirit. 
From the standpoint of that sphere, even world-history itself can be seen as but 
an appearance (Erscheinung) of the idea of the spirit, This view of reality 
closes the history of the world, but without the necessity of being understood as 
its historical end, that is to say, as an end-point in time. 
Hegel says that the philosophy of history only has to do with what is present, 
because the spirit counts as etemal tmth, Therefore, we can say that, accord-
ing to him, the philosophy of history considers history as the proper expression 
or objective form in which the absolute spirit comes into appearance. Phi-
losophy recognises in the past its tmth and that which remains present: 'Noth-
ings has been lost for it in the past because the idea is present, the spirit immor-
tal, that means: the spirit is neither bygone ñor not yet but essentially now' 
(VPG p, 105), In the periods of cultural or world-history philosophy seems to 
be a transhistorical moment in which the etemity of spirit is conceptually under-
stood, In this sense, every philosophy closes a particular historical period or 
totality. But not every ending is epoch-making. Seen from the standpoint of the 
history of philosophy, there exist, for Hegel, only two epochs that actually suc-
idem,pp. 114,123,127, 
Vorlesungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie /, p, 74, 
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 340, p, 288. 
12 IDEAS Y VALORES 
THE END OF HISTORY AND HEGEL'S CONCEPTION OF MODERNITY 
ceeded in making such a closure in a philosophically original way, namely the 
periods of Greek philosophy and of modern philosophy since Bacon and 
Descartes. These are special periods within the history oí philosophy, periods 
in which philosophy itself plays a role of historical importance. Between these 
two there is a third philosophical period in history, which, however, is not closed 
by a philosophical system of its own, namely the transitional period of mediae-
val christianity, during which the christian thinking strives to fmd a philosophical 
expression of its principie." Hegel seems to consider his own philosophy as the 
second period in history in which a world-historical epoch of philosophy comes 
to an end, Apparently, we also must not see this closure in too narrowly histori-
cal a way. Rather, the expression of the end of world-history counts as a philo-
sophical concept, referring to what Hegel calis, at the end of his system, "den 
dritten Schlufi' or the third form of closure, i.e., the philosophical concept in 
which nature and spirit are uníted.'* 
I think that, actually, history could be closed at each moment, because it is 
always form and work of the spirit, which can be conceived of as such, in its 
totality, But the spirit would not recognise in each moment a new total figure of 
world-historical importance, When we grasp the real world within the spheres 
of art, religión and philosophy, that is to say, in the sphere of the absolute spirit, 
reality appears in its totality, as closed in its end. This sphere of the absolute 
spirit is not bound by history, because history is merely its objective reality, to 
which spirit stands in a free relation," It is at great moments in history that a 
particular people or period acquires consciousness of this relation in such a way 
that it can find a proper language and way of expression for representing it in 
images or concepts. In that sense, art, religión and philosophy are historical too. 
Because philosophy is the highest and latest stage in this process of becoming 
conscious, the maturation of a great philosophy expresses the notion of the end 
of history in its most historical and pregnant form, This is so because art and 
religión are more closely connected with a particular cultural, social and politi-
cal form than philosophy. When philosophy brings this particular culture to the 
insight of its own rational principie, it presents it in the figure of its ultímate goal 
as its end, in regarding to which particular cultures apear as individual and finite 
entities. In its philosophy, a culture disengages itself from its particular history; 
it can no longer contain itself in this particular form. But this conception of a 
". Vorlesungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie I, pp. 123, 131-132. 
'*. Enzyklopadie, § 577, p. 463. The different ways of considering the place of the 
philosophy of history in relation to the whole of Hegel's philosophy are described in: 
Timo Bautz, Hegels Lehre von der Weltgeschichte. Zur togischen und systematischen 
Grundlegung der Hegelschen Geschichtsphilosophie, München 1988, p. 28. 
". Enzyklopadie, § 552, pp. 430-439. 
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historical end, as it can be conceived of from the standpoint of the absolute 
spirit, must not be identified with the image of an end-point of a concrete his-
torical period, ̂ ° Hegel's philosophy of history, which conceives world-history in 
the perspective of its end, or its actualised destination, is that part of the system 
in which his philosophy proves itself as the concept of the real world in which 
Hegel and his contemporaries are living as actual spiritual beings. Speaking 
more technically: the end of world-history is the real and actual moment at 
which the objective spirit knows itself philosophically as the adequate expres-
sion of absolute spirit in its temporal transition, It is the period in history in which 
the state, religión and philosophy recognise each other in a form of perfect 
harmony, 
4.THE END OF HISTORY AND (POST-)MODERNITY 
The absolute spirit cannot tum against reality or put itself in opposition to it as 
the totally different. The absoluteness of the spirit, or its detachment from time, 
does not mean that it has disengaged itself from the world. The absolute can 
only realise itself within the world and its history; it is working at every mo-
ment, even if it does not always appear as such. Because of its etemal pres-
ence, the absolute spirit does not necessarily involve the concept of the realisation 
of its ends as an end within or at the end of time. We must, probably, say, in the 
spirit of Hegel's philosophy, that the concept of the end of world-history makes 
clear the possibilities of a real history that is more adequate for a spirit that has 
come to a philosophical concept of itself Many philosophers think that Hegel's 
concept of the dialectical closure of philosophy exeludes a real fiiture develop-
ment of spirit. This opinión seems to me based on too simple a conception of 
what spirit means for Hegel. Karl Lówith, for example, asserts that modem 
historical thinking, in so far as it no longer believes in a history directed by divine 
providence, has broken with Hegel's metaphysical concept of spirit. Appar-
ently, he identifies Hegel's concept of spirit with some complex and abstract 
representation of a subsistent entity, separated from our conception of our-
selves. He thinks that history can go on because Hegel's philosophy of history 
appeared to be not realistic, but only the secularised versión of a Christian 
belief in salvation. Lówith says that it was only after Hegel's death that our 
own particular history of spirit (Geistesgeschichte) started. Geistesgeschichte, 
for Lówith, means history of ideas, a way of historical thinking based on posi-
tive scientific research conceming the development of concepts and ideas.^' 
'°. More about this ín: Bernard Bourgeoís, Éternité et historicité de I 'esprit selon 
Hegel,Pans99l,p. 104,andT.Bautz,ac.,pp, 140 ff. 
'̂, K Lówith, Hegel und die Aujhebung der Philosophie im 19. Jahrhundert - Max 
Weber, {= Sámtlíche Schriften 5), Smttgart 1988, p. 45; also pp. 249 ñ. 
14 IDEAS Y'VALORES 
Tin; END OF HISTORY AND HEGEL'S CONCEPTION OF MODERNITY 
But thcsc concepts of spirit and history do no justice to the philosophical subtlety 
by which Hegel himself cormects spirit, nature and freedom in a concept of 
historical development. 
We must acknowledge that the realisation of freedom as the end of history 
has not been completed in any way. It is absurd to consider the will and the 
belief in the possibility of realising this end as something that has been 
definitively left behind in the history of ideas, The concept of the end of history 
as the end of reason itself in its freedom opens a time of concrete political tasks 
that are totally adequate to the reality of spirit and cannot but awake its interest. 
According to Hegel, such a conception of time breaks through historícally in the 
way in which the Lutheran versión of Christianity started to consider the rela-
tion between the church and the state. Religión (or the church) can no longer 
place itself, within this relation, as a sepárate institute in opposition to the ethical 
world of the state, with all the risks and dangers of both a merely extemal and 
a fanatical religiousness, The divine spirit must penétrate the world in an imma-
nent way, It seems that the tmth of this identity of spirit and world has become, 
according to Hegel, a substantial certainty of the modem world, which it does 
not have to leam from philosophy, Modemity knows itself as this identity, and 
philosophy can only clear up this conception of modemity for itself Therefore, 
there is also no longer any need for philosophy to withdraw from the world, 
because within the world ít is ín its own element, 
Hegel's notorious statement about the identity ofactuality and reason sounds 
unbelievable to most of our contemporaries and even as blasphemy for some, 
Fifty years after the Second World War, it has almost become a commonplace 
to confront the pretensions of the Hegelian philosophy of history with the 'tmth 
of Auschwitz', Auschwitz would be the absolute refutation of Hegelian think-
ing of totality, with its identification of history, reason and providence. Notwith-
standing Adomo's statement that poetry would be impossible after Auschwitz, 
there exists an impressive poetry and art trying to give expression to the para-
doxes of this real experience of a God-forgotten world. But why should it be 
philosophically reasonable or necessary to associate Auschwitz with the 'death 
of God' or to consider it as a proof of God's 'withdrawing from the world'? 
Why anyway should we make God in some form make co-responsible for our 
sins? Rather, I think that an adequate understanding of the Hegelian concept of 
reality and freedom makes us conscious of the tmth that the modem human 
being himself is totally responsible for his world and cannot conceal this re-
sponsibility by speaking of withdrawing or waiting gods.̂ ^ Not the history of 
violence and evil, but only the (pre)history of myths has come to an end. It is not 
", Cf Martin Heidegger, Beitrage zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis),FrarMnit am 
Main 1989 (Gesamtausgabe Bd. 65), pp. 409-417,437 fif. 
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the task of philosophy to repair a postmodem mythology, but rather to free 
religión from its mythological ties. Philosophy and politics can meet each other 
in the same prose without generating fears that any sincere religión would be 
robbed of its right to exist or that individuáis should feel menaced in respect of 
their freedom. 
16 IDEAS Y VALORES 
